

ALLIES JOINT RESEARCH PROJECT



IMPACTS OF THE IRAQ WAR IN JORDAN

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
AMMAN | JUNE 2008

A PROJECT OF THE ALLIANCE LINKING
LEADERS IN EDUCATION AND THE SERVICES

Tufts
UNIVERSITY



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INTRODUCTION

The Joint Research Project is a program of the Alliance Linking Leaders in Education and the Services (ALLIES). ALLIES is an undergraduate led initiative that creates a bridge for shared understanding between future civilian and military leaders.

ALLIES was created at the Institute for Global Leadership in 2006; it built off an existing collaboration that had been bringing cadets and midshipmen to Tufts since the late 1980s.

The objective of ALLIES is to expand and integrate the ongoing relationship between the Institute for Global Leadership and the military's educational institutions. ALLIES fosters dialogue, encourages joint research opportunities, creates activities that bring together students at private liberal universities and future military officers, and educates about the role of the U.S. military at home and abroad.

The Joint Research Project (JRP) is an annual program that brings together future civilian and military leaders from the United States in a semester-long venture targeted at two specific needs:

1. The need for a new, integrated style of education for future military and civilian leaders, in which both sides are exposed to multiple perspectives of conflict management and engage with multiple dimensions of human security.
2. The need for future military and civilian leaders to fully understand the far-reaching impacts of US foreign policy decisions at the ground level.

Eleven students from Tufts University, the US Military Academy and the US Naval Academy conducted research in Amman, Jordan, from 1-28 June 2008. Participants worked in three groups to explore specific issues within the broader research focus: the impact of the Iraq war on Jordan's political reform process, Jordanian-US security cooperation, and the impact of Iraqi refugees in Jordanian society.

Students met with actors from multiple sectors of Jordanian society, including the United Nations Mission to Iraq, the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan, and the USAID Jordan Mission. Participants conducted formal and informal interviews, organizational site visits, and dialogue sessions. (For a complete listing of interviews, please see page 3.)

The policy recommendations contained in these memorandums represent participants' efforts to find effective solutions and courses of action for the problems and issues they researched in Jordan. Participants leveraged their different backgrounds – not only civilian and military, but also academic, political, cultural, and personal – to formulate practical policy recommendations based on diverse perspectives. Throughout the course of the trip, participants sometimes disagreed on the implications of the research they were conducting, and writing the recommendations required hours of debate and compromise. In writing the recommendations, the participants reckoned with the diverse set of institutions, people, and viewpoints they encountered in their research. Participants' differing perspectives and vantage points allowed them to, as a group, sift through the information they gathered and develop multi-faceted, unbiased recommendations.

The research in this policy recommendation was conducted in June 2008 and published in October 2008.

The policy recommendations in this publication were written by:

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UNITED STATES DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN JORDAN

INTRODUCTION

In 2003, the United States embarked upon a long-term strategy to defeat terrorism and secure peace and stability by supporting democratic transitions in the Middle East. This strategy was the underlying principle of what is now known as the Freedom Agenda, the Bush Administration's foreign policy paradigm for Arab states.

In the case of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, popular perceptions of US actions in the region have significantly undermined the credibility of US democracy promotion efforts within Jordan.

The Freedom Agenda has been institutionalized through funding allocations and new bureaucracies and, as a result, the next administration is likely to continue the US' pursuit of democratic transformations in the Middle East. Credibility is key to the success of these efforts. Therefore, the United States can and must take immediate steps to redress, reduce or explain inconsistencies in American regional strategy.

BACKGROUND

In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Freedom Agenda was conceived to reduce the appeal of extremist ideology by promoting liberal ideals and democratic institutions in the Middle East. Three new State Department programs have been created as tools of the Freedom Agenda: the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative; the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor; and the Middle East Partnership Initiative. In Jordan specifically, the USAID budget for democracy and governance increased from \$500,000 in 2002 to \$15 million in 2006¹. These new programs and the funding increase represent an institutionalization of the Freedom Agenda, which appears unlikely to be dismantled in the near future².

Despite new apparatuses and increased funding for democracy promotion efforts, Jordanians are skeptical of the United States' commitment

to democracy in the Middle East because of other regional policies. Many Jordanians see American treatment of political Islamist parties as hypocritical. Former secretary of Jordan's foremost opposition party, the Islamic Action Front (IAF, the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan), Dr. Latif Arabiyat asserted that American suspicion had prevented cooperation in areas of shared democratic interest such as women's political participation, education, and expanded civil liberties. "I am sorry to say the US gave some very bad signs from the outside: 'All Islamists are terrorists,'" he said³. The United States' 2006 refusal to accept Hamas as the democratically elected ruling party of the Palestinian Authority had an enormous impact in Jordan, where more than half of the population is of Palestinian descent⁴. It was seen as proof that the United States only supports democracy when it finds election outcomes favorable.

Furthermore, Jordan's own democratic reform process has made questionable progress in recent years. According to Human Rights Watch, in 2007 Jordan had "regressed in protecting basic rights," such as the freedom of speech, the press, and assembly⁵. However, that same year the United States indicated that Jordan was making democratic progress by awarding over \$117 million in grants through USAID's cash transfer program. The distribution of these transfers is conditional upon Jordan's fulfillment of designated policy reforms set annually⁶. By distributing these transfers in 2007, the United States gave the appearance of satisfaction with the level of democratic reform in Jordan. Jordan's importance as a strategic ally in the Iraq War has made it politically difficult for the United States to pressure Jordan to make political reforms beyond those favorable to the government of Jordan.

In the opinion of many Jordanians interviewed in June 2008, American support for a stalling domestic reform process and US regional rejection of legitimate Islamist parties indicate insincerity regarding the promotion of democracy in the region. As a result, the credibility of US efforts in Jordan has been damaged. According to USAID representatives in Jordan, in recent years Jordanian organizations have rejected USAID offers for funding⁷.

Mizan is a Jordanian organization that uses the law to pursue its democracy and human rights agenda: it provides legal counsel to vulnerable populations and lobbies Jordan's Parliament to amend civil society laws. Mizan will not accept funding from the United States because negative perceptions of American motives would damage Mizan's own legitimacy in the eyes of its constituents⁸.

Local, grassroots organizations like Mizan are a testament to the efforts of ordinary Jordanians to pressure their government for reforms. Ultimately, successful democratic transformation in Jordan will rely on this kind of bottom-up domestic impulse combined with political will from the top. For example, in 1989 King Hussein called for parliamentary elections for the first time in over 20 years in response to domestic pressure. Two years later, he launched the National Charter, which allowed for political parties in Jordan⁹. Public opinion surveys conducted by the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan in 2007 indicate that the desire for democracy in Jordan remains strong, with Jordanians indicating an overwhelming preference for a democratic system (defined by political freedoms) to an authoritarian system of government¹⁰. US democracy promotion in Jordan hopes to amplify this desire for democratic transformation.

However, the United States must walk a fine line between supporting the gradual adoption of liberal values at the grassroots level and actively encouraging top-down institutional change. For the United States to initiate or lead either of these efforts would be inappropriate and ineffectual; democratic reform in Jordan must be accomplished by Jordanians. Because of a convergence of interests, it is likely that the United States will continue its efforts to support reform. In order for American support to have a positive impact, it must have legitimacy among Jordan's population. This requires assuaging the skepticism many Jordanians currently have about the United States.

RECOMMENDATION 1:

TOUR DOWN THE RHETORIC OF THE FREEDOM AGENDA

The United States should limit the ambitious rhetoric of the Freedom Agenda and its democracy promotion exhortation so that it is more consistent with the feasible range of action and attainable goals.

The continued military presence of the United States in Iraq and the electoral success of Islamist movements, specifically the IAF in Jordan and Hamas in Palestine, have increased the United States' anxiety over regional security. In the interest of security, the United States has strengthened its support of incumbent regimes in Arab states rather than pressuring these regimes to reform. Rhetoric meant to promote and praise democratic reform in Jordan that does not also acknowledge the inconsistencies between the United States' security interests and its ability to advocate real progress undermines the perceived commitment of US calls for democracy and support for civil society reform actors in Jordan. Additionally, the Freedom Agenda does not recognize that the pace of democratic reform will ultimately be driven by domestic factors and not external pressure. Therefore, US exhortation that outstrips the slow, top-down reform process in Jordan worsens the gap between US rhetoric and reality. The United States can move to close this gap by:

- Limiting its praise for the Jordanian regime for reforms that have not created wide-scale political effects;
- Taking into account how the perception of the US' regional interests (especially in Iraq) and policies affects the credibility of its pressure for political reform in the eyes of the Government of Jordan;
- Redefining the goals of promoting political reform for Jordan from a western-style vision of participatory democracy to a vision of a political system that addresses the demographic realities (Palestinians, tribal influences, new economic classes) and political needs of Jordanians.

**RECOMMENDATION 2:
IDENTIFY ATTAINABLE POLITICAL GOALS**

The United States should focus its democracy promotion efforts on attainable political goals in Jordan such as youth engagement, civil education, and building tools for an independent press and media.

In order to close the gap between rhetoric and realistic capabilities, the United States must also identify, define, and implement a more attainable set of goals to support reforms in Jordan. As described by Marina Ottaway, “The most promising projects are those where the interests of the United States, the regime, and reform advocates overlap.”¹¹ Identifying these nexuses of interests is key in formulating realizable reform projects. Attainable projects, in addition to more reasonable rhetoric from the US on democratic reform, would realign the United States’ message, goals, and on-the-ground efforts into a cohesive strategy with tangible outcomes. Areas of focus should include:

- Youth engagement – The United States should fund programs that work on youth outreach to build community and promote civic as well as economic capacity building and opportunities.
- Civic Education – The United States should encourage Jordanian groups to develop a “Civic Curriculum” for schools and general public awareness campaigns.
- Supporting independent press and media projects – The US should fund efforts to expand internet access, blogging, community radio, and efforts to reform the Press Law.

**RECOMMENDATION 3:
ENGAGE WITH THE ISLAMIC ACTION FRONT (IAF)**

The IAF should be included in US outreach to Jordanian political parties, in order to gain a more holistic view of Jordanian politics and identify projects that a wider set of reform advocates will support.

By engaging with the IAF, the strongest opposition party in Jordan, the United States can learn important lessons about the current state of political discourse in Jordan, the efficacy of various models for organization and mobilization, and new opportunities to push the reform

process forward. Only talking to the Government of Jordan and civil society actors that will say what they believe the US wants to hear in order to receive American funding will not deliver a clear picture of political realities. It is possible to discuss the challenges of political reform and shared democratic interests with the Muslim Brotherhood while still disagreeing on certain political platforms of the IAF. Inclusion of the IAF, one of the most important political entities in Jordan, in a larger engagement effort with political parties and Jordanians citizens need not confer legitimacy on all the positions held by the IAF. However, it can lead to a richer and more balanced reform effort in Jordan, whereby both external and internal reformers contribute different sets of strengths.

**RECOMMENDATION 4:
CHANNEL DEMOCRACY AID THROUGH DIFFERENT SOURCES**

American funding for democracy promotion should not be channeled through the State Department, but rather through non-governmental organizations, such as the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), and the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), or other international organizations, such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).

The development of democratic culture in the Middle East is a long-term interest of the US. This goal is sometimes incongruent with the US' short-term diplomatic and security goals. Association with widely unpopular US foreign policy and geopolitical interests, as represented by the State Department and USAID, can undermine the efficacy of programs funded by these sources. Many civil society actors and reformers in Jordan refuse to take funding from the US Government because it taints their credibility in the eyes of the Jordanians they hope to reach or serve. In order to fund worthy and credible Jordanian reformers, it is better for democracy promotion aid to come from sources with a level of separation from the US Government. Channeling funding through more independent groups such as NDI, NED, IREX, UNDP, and other NGOs can provide that degree of separation and allow US funds to reach credible Jordanian organizations that would otherwise not be able to utilize American funds.

SUPPORTING EVIDENCE

Many Jordanian civil society actors themselves described the credibility challenges of the United States' involvement with democracy promotion in Jordan. According to Mohammed Abu Rumman, a journalist of the *Al-Ghad* Arabic Daily, US calls for democracy were taken less seriously by the Jordanian Government and Jordanian civil society due to developments of 2006-2007: deterioration of security in Iraq, the election of Hamas in Palestine, and the relative empowerment of Iran in new regional dynamics. These events forced the United States to pull back from applying adamant pressure on friendly, authoritarian regimes in the region to undertake political reforms. This lessening of pressure discredited the US calls for reform in the eyes of civil society actors in Jordan and the region. Rumman claims that civil society actors and academics in Jordan will be wary of any renewed, vigorous calls for democracy from the United States.

Additionally, the United States' regional policies create a quandary for Jordanian civil society actors to navigate if they are to accept American funds and maintain credibility in the eyes of Jordanian citizens. Numerous sources indicated that there are instances of Jordanian NGO's involved with political reform, human rights advocacy, and governance issues rejecting USAID funds. The director of Mizan (see Background section), Ms. Eva Abu Halaweh, explained that she will not accept American funding because the United States does not have an acceptable human rights record and the people who seek assistance from Mizan (whether Jordanian, Jordanian of Palestinian descent, or refugees from Iraq) harbor suspicions of the US' ulterior motives as a result of the Iraq war and American support for Israel. Whether these suspicions are founded or unfounded, the perceptions of the United States and mistrust of US involvement can discredit any civil society organization that directly partners with the United States.

Since direct US support for democracy promotion is suspect in the eyes of Jordanians, the United States should both redirect some of its governance aid to Jordan through independent institutions, as well as focus its own direct, visible spending on attainable goals that are in alignment with a more modest rhetoric. These attainable goals should

be areas of shared interest between the US government, government of Jordan, and civil society actors such as youth engagement, civil education, and independent media. According to Save the Children, 60 percent of Jordan's population is under 24 years old and 70 percent of youth one year out of school are still unemployed. In a society where the unemployment rate is officially 13.5 percent (and unofficially closer to 30 percent), unemployed, educated youth may search for opportunities outside Jordan¹². With the current demographics, development of economic opportunities and training programs for youth would be highly suitable for Jordan's economic interests, as well as for the security interests of the United States. Similarly, civic education and the growth of independent media are congruous both with King Abdullah's National Agenda and with the United States' goal of spreading liberal democratic ideals. According to Sami Zubaidy, a journalist for the Jordanian daily *Al-Rai*, internet newsmedia has great potential to become a thriving arena for political discourse because internet publications can claim liberties restricted by current Press Laws in Jordan. However, the high cost of internet remains the greatest barrier to the growth of this arena (Zubaidy). US support for Jordan's internet infrastructure is a tangible project that is likely to support political openness and impact positively on Jordanian's opinion of the US government.

THE WAY FORWARD

Ultimately, democratization is a Jordanian process dependent on domestic political will. Any external democracy promotion efforts must look to identify areas where incentives exist and align with the goals of various sectors of Jordanian society. At the level of high politics, the key to US efforts is to creatively market pro-reform aid programs to the Jordanian leadership as a necessary measure to maintain domestic stability. Among the general population, the goals of US democracy promotion should be modest and seek ways to support those needs identified by Jordanians themselves.

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- 3 Abdul Latif Arabiyat. Former Secretary General, Islamic Action Front. Personal Communication. 18 June 2008.
- 4 “Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan”. Culture Grams World Edition. 2007.
- 5 Human Rights Watch. “Country Summary: Jordan”. Jan 2008. www.humanrights.org. Accessed 12 May 2008.
- 6 Kathryn Stevens. Director, Office of Program Management, USAID Jordan. Personal Communication. 10 June 2008.
- 7 Ibid
- 8 Eva Abu Halaweh. Director, Mizan. Personal Communication. 5 June 2008.
- 9 Choucair, Julia. “Illusive Reform: Jordan’s Stubborn Stability”. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- 10 Braizat, Fares. “Democracy In Jordan 2007”. Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan. December 2007.
- 11 Ottaway, Marina. “Democracy Promotion in the Middle East: Restoring Credibility”. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. May 2008. page 6.
- 12 Country Report: Jordan. *CIA World Factbook*. 2 Oct 2008. www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/jo.html (3 Oct 2008).

UNITED STATES-JORDANIAN SECURITY COOPERATION

INTRODUCTION

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has proven to be one of the United States' most valuable Middle Eastern allies. Its geo-strategic location enables it to play a major role in the region, but being small and lacking natural resources, it also predestines it for greater vulnerability as its fate is tied to the political and economic futures of its neighbors. In its efforts to promote a secure and stable Iraq, US foreign policy in the Middle East needs to support Jordan as a regional leader.

BACKGROUND

Jordan's relationship with Iraq incorporates both Iraqi relations with other regional actors and the over-arching regional strategy of the Hashemite Monarchy. In its traditional role as the inter-Arab mediator, Jordan has often sought to bring about a peaceful cessation to hostilities and has worked to craft an Arab consensus which is amicable to Hashemite interests.

King Abdullah was vehemently opposed to the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003. He argued that deposing Saddam Hussein from power would upset regional stability and usher in sectarian violence in Iraq, opening the door to external influence. However, once the confrontation between the United States and Saddam Hussein's regime began, Jordan sought to cooperate with the US and has since worked extensively to secure internal peace in Iraq. Jordan was the first Arab state to send an ambassador to Baghdad post-2003, and Jordan's International Police Training Center (JIPTC) trained over 55,000 Iraqi police officers in the aftermath of the invasion. JIPTC, created in June 2003 to address the severe lack of quality police forces inside the new Iraq, rapidly became the world's largest police academy¹. At its peak, JIPTC housed and trained 3,720 Iraqi police officers, with classes of over 800 graduating every four weeks². While JIPTC cost the United States \$450 million over the course of four years, Sunni and Shia alike trained and lived together, and sectarian identity melted away as policemen learned to

prioritize national unity³. JIPTC was especially important in that it produced a civil police force as opposed to a national army. Because the complexities of counterinsurgency warfare render an effective police force of greater utility in combating insurgents than traditional military units, JIPTC was a crucial lynchpin in efforts to ensure long term Iraqi stability. Unfortunately, United States funding for JIPTC was cut off in 2007 due to the lack of monitoring of JIPTC trainees once they returned to Iraq.

The 2003 Coalition invasion of Iraq posed many significant problems for the Hashemite Monarchy. Beyond upsetting the traditional understanding between Saddam Hussein and the Hashemites, the advent of representative government in Iraq empowered the Shia majority. The Shia ascendancy in Iraq coincided with a renewal in Iranian posturing and Hezbollah advances in Lebanon, leading King Abdullah in December 2004 to famously criticize the rise of a “Shia crescent,” stretching from Tehran into the Levant.

The reality of the interconnected destinies of Amman and Baghdad was brought home in November 2005, when Abu Musab al Zarqawi’s Al Qaeda in Iraq conducted a series of bombings aimed at civilian targets in Amman. As the Amman bombings demonstrated, instability and insurgency in Iraq are likely to continue to spill over into Jordan for the foreseeable future. The desire to minimize spill-over violence has played a major role in formulating Jordan’s Iraq policy post-2003.

Ultimately, Jordan has played a constructive if limited role in the development of the new Iraq⁴. While many regional actors have sought to destabilize Iraq and provoke chaos in order to advance their strategic agendas, Jordan has worked with Iraqi security forces and government officials to rebuild Iraq as a peaceful, secure, and sovereign entity⁵.

Jordan also continues to provide invaluable military assistance to the United States. Nevertheless, the overall balance of consequences of the war on Jordan has been negative:

- Jordan lost its main trading partner, which had also supplied high-

- ly subsidized oil for 15 years;
- The influx of an estimated 450,000 to 1,000,000 Iraqis has put a strain on Jordan's limited resources and has altered the natural growth of consumer prices;
- As a Sunni power, Jordan is increasingly worried about an influential Iran in Iraq and about exacerbating the Sunni-Shiite divide;
- Jordan has become a terrorist target and is experiencing a rise in domestic extremism.

These consequences constrain Jordan's ability to cooperate effectively with the United States and advance US interests in Iraq.

**RECOMMENDATION 1:
BUILD THE CAPABILITY OF THE IRAQI POLICE TO ENSURE
SECURITY**

The United States and Jordan should resume their partnership to train and equip Iraqi police officers, in order to gradually and fully restore their responsibility for policing, public order, and counterinsurgency operations. The United States should:

- Propose the establishment of an international fund to resume the training of Iraqi police officers at the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC);
- Conduct an assessment of previous strengths and deficiencies of JIPTC, in order to implement the necessary improvements and ensure the highest quality of training and success, including the monitoring of Center graduates;
- Establish the stages of a training process that outlines the path to a self-sufficient Iraqi National Police Force.

**RECOMMENDATION 2:
ALLOW FOR A SUCCESSFUL POLITICAL PROCESS TO ENSURE
POLITICAL STABILITY**

The United States should encourage Jordan to spearhead a region-wide diplomatic surge of Arab political engagement with the Iraqi government. The United States should:

- Work with Nayef Zeidan, the Jordanian ambassador in Baghdad,

- to actively engage the Iraqi government and other Arab neighbors in an effort to restore Iraq's standing within in the Arab world;
- Encourage Jordan to reach out to all levels of Iraqi society, in an effort to build bridges between both countries' civil societies to foster constructive relations for the future;
 - Assist the governments of Jordan and Iraq in reaching out to Iraqis living in Jordan, in an effort to provide for their economic, health, and education needs and to ease their eventual transition back into Iraqi society. The US should encourage the use of Iraqi oil revenues, having Iraq invest in its own future;
 - Encourage Jordan to actively discourage the anti-Shia rhetoric aimed at Iraqi refugees.

**RECOMMENDATION 3:
ENHANCE THE APPROPRIATE FINANCIAL CHANNELS TO ENSURE
RECONSTRUCTION**

The United States should reconsider and re-evaluate the various channels through which it provides financial assistance for the reconstruction of Iraq. The United States should:

- Ensure that funds needed for civilian programs in Iraq are available through the Department of State or other civilian agencies. The United States should make sure that civilian programs do not see themselves forced to resort to military funding from the Department of Defense;
- Promote the involvement of highly specialized civilian agencies, easing the burden often placed on the military to perform civilian activities;
- Refocus efforts in reconstruction policy to basic infrastructure that improves the quality of life of all Iraqis, while only gradually and subtly pushing for democratic and liberal values.

SUPPORTING EVIDENCE

The above recommendations are based on more than 16 interviews conducted in Jordan in June 2008.

Dr. Mohammad Zweiri, an expert on Iran at the Center for Strategic

Studies, identified a number of causes and possible implications for a Jordanian-Iraqi rapprochement, and more broadly, an expansion of Iraqi ties to other Arab states. Subsequent to his visit to Tehran, Iraq's Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki made his way to Amman to discuss relations with the Jordanian government and King Abdullah personally. Maliki's visit came two years after the Jordanians originally named an ambassador to Iraq, but withdrew Ahmed al Lozi because of security concerns. The visit marked a general sea change in the Arab world in which the status-quo powers began to accept the new, Shia-led Iraqi government. Not only did the Maliki visit embody a breakthrough in Jordanian-Iraqi relations, with a brand new three-year oil deal signed, but it also paved the way for an Iraqi reconciliation with Saudi Arabia.

According to Zweiri, many Jordanians are clearly unnerved by perceived Iranian influence in Iraq. Sunni Arabs tend to see a "Shia crescent" falling over the region, extending from Tehran, through Iraq into Syria, and into Lebanon⁶. Iran has gained leverage and influence in Iraq through reaching out to all players in Iraqi politics, regardless of sectarian or ideological affiliation. Through reaching out to all actors inside Iraq, Iran has established a rapport with factions both inside and outside Baghdad. To counterbalance this trend, the United States and Jordan must engage in a similar political game. The U.S. must encourage Jordan to engage in relations with all Iraqi political factions, especially those outside of the central government, including the Awakening Councils and Shia groups in the south. Only by approaching the problem of Iraq as a political contest instead of a security matter can Jordan promote lasting stability. It is unlikely that an independent and strong Iraq will ever be friendly with Iran because of cultural, historical, and religious reasons⁷. Consequently, Iran's objective in Iraq is to foster disunity and instability. Jordan and the Arab states must vigorously counteract this Iranian maneuvering by fostering closer ties not only with the Baghdad government, but also with marginalized groups throughout Iraqi society⁸.

According to interviews with NGO officials, King Abdullah is using the wedge issue of anti-Shiism, coupled with a nationalist appeal, against Iraqis to bolster his own standing. Given Jordan's economic

downturn, rising costs, and high oil prices, the new Iraqi republic is an easy rhetorical target. While this does give the Monarchy an important scapegoat, it damages the long term Iraqi-Jordanian relationship. The State Department is aware of the Monarchy's vacillation on this subject and has approached senior NGO officials to try to use their leverage to gain better treatment for Iraqi refugees. Unfortunately, due to the extensive security alliance between Jordan and the United States, no one in the Embassy feels comfortable calling out Jordan on its short-sighted practices. This is clearly a delicate situation. The U.S. needs Jordan for strategic positioning, regional stability, and operational space to project power into the Middle East and beyond. However, its reliance on Jordanian friendship must also consider the foremost U.S. interest in the region, which is a stable, responsible, and independent Iraq fully integrated into the Arab fold. Jordanian anti-Shia rhetoric directly damages the prospects for an Iraqi reconciliation with the Arab world, making an Iraq-Iran détente more likely. In order for Iran to be checked, Iraq must emerge as a mainstream Arab partner. While the US must appreciate its special relationship with Jordan, it must also not lose sight of the long term regional implications with Iraq.

Yasar Qatareh of the Regional Centre for Conflict Prevention was critical of the Arab states and their failure to embrace the new Iraq. According to Qatareh, the Arabs focused too much on the security implications of instability in Iraq and failed to develop a comprehensive strategy to aggressively mold Iraq into a favorable outcome. By this, Qatareh means that short term security concerns—arising especially after the 2005 Amman attacks—completely dominated the strategic discourse in the Arab world and consequently the long term benefits to be won through intensive political engagement were lost in the wind. Indicative of this trend was the disastrous mistake on the part of King Abdullah of throwing together the entire Iraqi Shia community into the infamous “Shia Crescent.” Such an inflammatory comment created resentment towards Jordan within Iraq, and individuals who might otherwise have been sympathetic towards working with the Americans were dissuaded because King Abdullah had made clear that the Arabs saw no distinction between the many numerous Shia factions in Iraq. For the Arabs, the matter became a matter of secu-

rity instead of one of politics—the Shia of Iraq represented Iranian influence and were consequently an enemy to be challenged instead of a diverse political group to be engaged on an individual basis. For the Arabs to serve their own long term interests, they need to place a much greater emphasis on political maneuvering in Iraq and less emphasis on security issues.

As part of the quest for lasting stability in Iraq, the United States has expended a large amount of resources on Iraqi reconstruction. While direct United States reconstruction can be an effective part of its counterinsurgency strategy, direct aid (especially from the United States Army), often carries with it a negative connotation for local aid recipients. In addition, many international aid organizations are uncomfortable or unwilling to accept aid from the United States military out of a concern of losing their perceived neutrality. Many international organizations, such as the United Nations Office for Project Services Overseas (UNOPS), are desperately in need of funding to carry out Iraqi reconstruction and would welcome American aid money. However, the regulations governing UNOPS prevent it from receiving aid directly from the Department of Defense. A simple funding reallocation—from DoD to the State Department—would allow organizations such as UNOPS to accept American money and implement the development projects that are so critical to fostering Iraqi self-determination and stability. Reallocating significant reconstruction funds from DoD to the State Department would not add any cost and would dramatically increase the utility of each dollar to win the battle for the Iraqi population⁹.

1 Bill Flink. The Embassy of the United States of America, Amman, Jordan. Personal Communication. 17 June 2008.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 Lasensky, Scott. “Jordan and Iraq.” United States Institute of Peace. December 2006. 16 May 2008. <<http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr178.pdf>>.

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IRAQI REFUGEES IN JORDAN

INTRODUCTION

Currently, it is estimated that ten percent of Iraq's population -- more than two million people -- is externally displaced, according to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). This ten percent includes virtually every ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic group in Iraq¹. A large swath of this externally displaced population is living in limbo in Jordan, unable to work or to go to school, with only a small percentage receiving just enough cash assistance and basic social services to survive². The inability to support their families, further their educations, or plan for their futures is demoralizing and a waste of valuable skills that could contribute to the rebuilding of Iraq.

If the United States addresses the Iraqi refugee crisis in a well-thought out, long-term plan, it can restore this human capital to Iraqi society. If it addresses this crisis poorly, Iraqis living in exile may have little to offer their country when they return, if they return at all. Additionally, if the United States does not address the crisis well, it will leave a significant Arab ally with a large, unemployed, vulnerable and angry refugee population. By saddling Jordan with such a large burden and draining Iraq of its valuable human capital, the United States would leave the region worse off, both for its citizens and for US interests.

BACKGROUND

The first "wave" of Iraqi refugees entered Jordan in 1991 during the Gulf War; however, the number of Iraqis living in Jordan has sharply increased since the US-led war in Iraq that began in 2003, with most Iraqi refugees coming to Jordan after the Sumara mosque bombings in 2006. While the demographic trends are known, the actual number of Iraqis living in Jordan is a highly politicized issue and varies from source to source. The highest estimate sits at around one million³, while the lowest is around 250,000⁴. The US and Jordanian governments accept the 2007 findings of Fafo, a Norwegian organization commissioned by the Jordanian government, which argues that 450,000 Iraqis are living in Jordan⁵. Most of these 450,000 are there illegally⁶. Complicating

the issue is that Jordan never signed the 1951 Refugee Convention, or its 1967 Protocol, which outlines specific rights and procedure for refugees. In 1998, Jordan did sign a Memorandum of Understanding with UNHCR, which allows Iraqis asylum seeker status, but not *prima facie* refugee status. Although UNHCR has made a Temporary Protection Regime that issues asylum seeker cards to Iraqis, the cards are not recognized by the government and provide Iraqis with no legal protection. As of June 2008, UNHCR had officially registered 53,227 Iraqis in Jordan⁷.

Although the Jordanian government gives Iraqis slightly more privileges⁸ than other foreigners -- allowing them full access to education and the same access to healthcare as non-insured Jordanians, for example -- many Iraqis report discrimination and blocked access to these social services⁹. Because most Iraqis are not legally residing in Jordan, they are unable to obtain work permits and must live on cash assistance distributed by NGOs like CARE International. Lack of legal status also means that most Iraqis live in fear of deportation; many do not seek work in the informal sector for fear of being arrested and forcibly returned to Iraq. For those Iraqis that are registered with UNHCR, the only legal solution is third-country resettlement. Yet many Iraqis wait in Jordan well past the six-month period demanded by the Jordanian government for resettlement, largely because the American and other countries' embassies are struggling to keep up with the huge demand for visa processing¹⁰.

The Jordanian government exhibits an understandable hesitation to implement a long term Iraqi population policy. Most Iraqis in Jordan wish to repatriate to a stable Iraq, or to resettle to a third country, but the realities of the security situation in Iraq, and the inability of UNHCR and third-country hosts to quickly resettle even the small percentage of Iraqis registered with UNHCR, indicates that most Iraqis will not be leaving Jordan in the near term.

**RECOMMENDATION 1:
ESTABLISH A SEMIANNUAL SURVEY**

The United States government should use its diplomatic channels to ensure the implementation of a semiannual, impartial survey of the numbers and characteristics of the post-2003 Iraqi refugee population.

The United States government should fund the implementation of a semiannual survey of displaced Iraqis in Jordan to allow for better implementation of any and all services. The US must recognize that influential stakeholders each have an interest in low or high numbers being accepted as official fact, and so it should make extra effort to ensure the impartiality and legitimacy of the findings. Recognizing that many segments of the Jordanian government believe that the maintenance of the status quo is in its best interest, the US must work through the numerous diplomatic channels that already exist to convince the government of the urgency that it treat the Iraqi population as a special refugee population. The US can best do this by:

- Funding the study through a third party, whether it is through a nongovernmental organization such as Fafo, or through a supranational organization, such as the United Nations Population Fund;
- Conducting the survey semiannually until Iraqis begin leaving Jordan in significant number;
- Involving Jordan in defining the focus of the survey and research.

**RECOMMENDATION 2:
NORMALIZE THE STATUS OF DISPLACED IRAQIS**

The United States should utilize its influence and provide conditional aid in order to ensure a protective status specifically for Iraqis in Jordan that includes the right to work.

Bearing in mind that the treatment of Iraqis in Jordan now will have implications for the future stability of the Iraqi state, the US should propose and back a temporary protection status for externally dis-

placed Iraqis in Jordan. It should include protections similar to the 1998 Memorandum of Understanding and the 2003 temporary protection status instituted by UNHCR but not agreed to by the Government of Jordan. At a minimum, it should alleviate fears of deportation, provide legal guarantee of access to services, access to secondary education, and continued access to primary education. The US should also work with Jordan to find avenues to utilize the Iraqi human capital in Jordan (e.g. allowing doctors to work in health clinics for Iraqi refugees, allowing teachers to organize schools...), thereby helping both Jordan and the Iraqi refugees. The United States can do this by:

- Pushing for protective status to be extended to those Iraqis who have come to Jordan since conflict ensued in 2003, including all Iraqis facing generalized violence should they return to Iraq, and not just those who specifically fall under the definition of a refugee under the 1951 Convention or its 1967 Protocol;
- Accepting the commensurate costs of registering Iraqis into this temporary protection status and asking UNHCR to implement the registration process;
- Utilizing US clout and influence in order to make this legal status a reality, and providing a substantial, conditionalized aid package to the Government of Jordan in order to offset the costs to the Jordanian economy, primarily arising from Jordan's already high inflation level of 15 percent;
- Supporting equal rights for Iraqis to compete with other foreigners for work permits, as well as supporting a noncompetitive work permit that allows Iraqis to work in Jordan until stability resumes in Iraq and repatriation can occur.

**RECOMMENDATION 3:
IMPROVE PROCESSING OF US RESETTLEMENT REQUESTS**

The United States government must meet its commitments to Iraqis that have worked with the US government and military in Iraq. It must use full diplomatic force in Jordan to fulfill the annual quotas prescribed by Defense Authorization Act of 2008 and streamline the process of resettlement of the caseloads given to the embassy by UNHCR.

The US should live up to its commitment to resettle 30,000 Iraqis in the next five years; additionally, it should fill the Defense Authorization Act quota of an annual 5,000 Iraqis who have assisted US military efforts. The US should commit to resettle a total of 110,000 Iraqis in the next ten years, including the annual 5,000 Defense Authorization Act quota. To accomplish this, the United States must improve its ability to quickly and efficiently process Iraqis eligible for resettlement in the US through the US Embassy in Amman.

- The United States must increase staff at the Embassy to better handle the volume of cases identified by UNHCR. The backlog is best addressed with increased midlevel Department of Homeland Security staffing on site in Amman.
- The United States should reconsider the Patriot Act of 2001 and Real ID Act of 2005 (the material support laws), granting asylum to any refugee or asylum seeker whose support for terrorism was coerced, unintentional, or inconsequential.
- The United States should encourage a public information campaign to better inform Iraqis of the nuances of UNHCR programs and support and the levels of legal and illegal status Iraqis can have in Jordan. The United States should encourage UNHCR to distribute informational pamphlets and conduct door-to-door informational campaigns in neighborhoods with high levels of Iraqi refugees.
- Additionally, the US should push UNHCR to explicitly outline to Iraqis what asylum seeker status entails and what rights it affords and does not afford.

**RECOMMENDATION 4:
IMPROVE QUALITY OF AND ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE FOR IRAQI
REFUGEES IN JORDAN**

The United States should implement a two-sided funding plan focused on both a long-term build-up of the Jordanian health care system and a short-term emergency response.

The United States should support the World Health Organization (WHO) as the best-placed technical agency to coordinate government-

tal and non-governmental efforts in health care for Iraqis living in Jordan. The United States can provide the projected funds to implement the WHO's working plan to scale up the Jordanian health system to tackle the needs of the Iraqis while building a long-lasting system that will ultimately see Jordanians as the primary beneficiaries.

The United States has given Jordan \$1.7 million to handle health care needs of Iraqis to date. The World Health Organization has been working with the Ministry of Health to ease the medical prices on Iraqis living in Jordan. The United States can provide the projected funds to implement the WHO's working plan to scale up the Jordanian health system to tackle the needs of both Iraqis and Jordanians. The projected WHO budget for FY 2008 is \$9.6 million, of which 29 percent has already been met by funds from the international community. The United States should provide the remainder of the funding, given the level of commitment thus far, which has also included \$1.4 million to the WHO for pharmaceutical drugs for Iraqis. This funding will also upgrade the system to benefit all Jordanians for long term development efforts while addressing the immediate needs of Iraqis displaced within Jordan.

The United States should implement this two-sided funding plan by:

- Provide full funding to WHO-Jordan for fiscal year 2009 to implement programming that will build up the Jordanian system as a whole, enabling targeted service to Iraqis specifically via access to secondary and tertiary care for chronic illnesses, access to mental and psychosocial care, strengthening surveillance and information systems, and technical support for inter-agency coordination between the governmental and non-governmental sectors.
- At the same time, the US should support those NGOs that are in operation exclusively for the Iraqi population displaced within Jordan. Among these are Caritas, Save the Children and CARE International. These health programs and clinics serve the Iraqi population most effectively as they waive the "foreign guest" fees placed by the Government of Jordan on Iraqis who have been displaced. Also, these clinics are best suited to address the imme-

diate health needs of Iraqis as they are within the communities of the displaced, provide a safe space and are well known to Iraqis.

- Support the health efforts of international and NGOs that lack the continuous funding to continue emergency and essential health services specifically for Iraqis as a short term provision while WHO-Jordan efforts are being implemented.

SUPPORTING EVIDENCE

The above recommendations derive from the major themes and concerns highlighted by the different stakeholders in the Iraqi refugee situation in Jordan. While government officials, international NGOs, and displaced Iraqis had different priorities and concerns based on their interests and areas of work, there were several overarching themes voiced by all.

Firstly and most importantly, there was a general consensus that accounting for the number of displaced Iraqis currently in Jordan was a difficult and incomplete task. Governmental officials, such as spokesmen for the Ministry of International Cooperation and Planning, noted that, while the Fafo study was commissioned by the government, the psychological status of displaced Iraqis and their legal statuses attributed to projection of such varying numbers as 150,000 (Fafo Study) and 450,000 (government press release and official number). From the perspective of organizations on the ground, such as ICRC, UNHCR, WHO, and CARE International, the lack of a comprehensive survey of the population hindered the efforts of the organizations in providing aid to displaced Iraqis and to the Jordanian government. This concern was beyond attributing a number to the population and included the need for demographic data such as health status, educational level, mental state, and current economic status. Without this vital information, donations from the international community via the UN and from the US government potentially go wasted due to misallocation of funds in programs that do not have sufficient background on the population living in Jordan.

While on the one hand recommending any sort of aid to the Jordanian government or to private international NGOs depends on first know-

ing how many displaced Iraqis there are and assessing their needs, the evidence highlighting that the US can do more to aid the Iraqis already identified by the government and NGOs compels the need for recommendation two. UNHCR, in conjunction with the government of Jordan, with which it has a Memorandum of Understanding to provide durable solutions to Iraqis with refugee status, impressed the need for more logistical and monetary support for its work. While funding for UN agencies is a continual struggle dependent on state willingness and capabilities, the US has a clear path of action in this realm because there are already thousands of identified displaced Iraqis under the watch of UNHCR who are waiting to be processed by the US Embassy. US Embassy personnel echoed that processing visas for resettlement or voluntary repatriation of the small number (11 percent of all Iraqis in Jordan) of refugee-status Iraqis took many months due to coordination with the State Department. Increasing personnel on-site in Jordan would expedite the process and legitimize US support of concrete action since the UNHCR is the only legal entity providing relief to Iraqi refugees. Given the Jordanian government's primary concern about national security, the US has little room to maneuver aid via any channels other than through the government (including through UNHCR). Thus, providing as much needed support to process the claims of already-identified refugees gives the US a narrow plan of action that is easily executable.

However, despite what US embassy personnel alluded to as a tricky balance between wanting to comprehensively address the Iraqi situation and complying with the Jordanian government's security concerns and terms of aid allocation, the US must use all leverage possible to address the legal status of displaced Iraqis. Senior government officials conceded that the immigrant status of Iraqis – whether they are legally refugees under UNHCR mandates or not – is the only politically viable option short of closing borders – an illegal action under the Geneva Conventions. Furthermore, the continued lament concerning the lack of natural resources and the growing number of unemployed young people impressed the sentiment that most Jordanians cannot be asked to give more to help displaced Iraqis (Judeh, Shraideh). Indeed, Jordanians, as echoed by community-based NGO leaders, feel that Jordan is

already doing more than her neighbors in aiding Iraqis and believe the US is the duty holder in the situation (MIZAN). Meanwhile, testimonies of Iraqis living in idle with no work and in fear of deportation and of an unknown future compel a recommendation whereby the US leverage its position as a benefactor to Jordan and lobby for normalized, protective status of displaced Iraqis within Jordan (refugee interviews). Conditioning aid would be the most efficient way to ensure that Iraqis can at least access education, healthcare, and limited housing and job markets. Senior officials, however, complained that the US did not designate any specific FY2007 funds for government administered assistance to Iraqis highlights the current lack of any US policy dealing with the issue of Iraqi refugee status (Shraideh).

Despite the normalization of legal status standing in the way of ensuring the well being of displaced Iraqis in Jordan, the Government of Jordan has turned a blind eye to private international NGOs' relief works targeted at Iraqis. This is a crucial aspect of the displaced Iraqi situation in Jordan that the US government can use to its advantage in channeling aid and support to the population. In the realm of education, several UN bodies, notably UNICEF, were able to convince the Government of Jordan to allow Iraqi children to attend school. This prompted huge support among donor states and won the approval of the Government of Jordan because the funding went to build up the educational system as a whole, even as it was aiding Iraqis specifically. This provides a key lesson in addressing Iraqi needs: when trying to deliver vital services to Iraqis, programming must be directed to building up the Jordanian system as a whole, aiding vulnerable Jordanians as well (UNHCR, Shraideh, ICRC).

Thus, drawing from the lesson of the education access, recommendation four attempts to copy the same success in the provision of healthcare. Not surprisingly, displaced Iraqis testified that health issues and expenses were the most important factors contributing to deteriorating lifestyle and well being. This is especially true for mental health deterioration, which itself poses further difficulties as it is a stigma in Arab society (ICRC, CARE International, WHO). WHO, which is best placed as a technical assistance body to increase the capacity of the Jor-

danian healthcare system as a whole, while aiding displaced Iraqi needs, emphasized the lack of information on Iraqis' health status as hindering the effectiveness of WHO programming to help all of Jordan's vulnerable populations. Budgetary constraints constitute the bulk of WHO's concerns in properly addressing the Jordanian government's desire to upgrade their public healthcare system and the international community's concern in helping displaced Iraqis get sufficient access to adequate healthcare. With only 29 percent of its \$9.2 million budget met in FY2008, neither the people of Jordan nor the displaced Iraqis will benefit from an upgraded Jordanian health system as a whole.

THE WAY FORWARD

The Iraqi refugee crisis should be addressed in such a way that Iraqis living in Jordan are able to return and positively contribute to Iraq's reconstruction. Since it is likely that most Iraqis in Jordan will remain there for the short term, they should be able to live with a sense of normalcy – full access to education, access to affordable and non-discriminative healthcare, some ability to support themselves, some type of legal and recognized status, and timely third-country resettlement for those who qualify. In return, the US needs to offset the strain on Jordanian services and the economy. Once stability begins to return to Iraq, Iraqis should begin returning as soon as possible. Those who have not yet returned should be living with a sense of normalcy, but should be preparing to resume their lives and places in Iraqi society. The US should live up to its commitment to resettle 30,000 Iraqis in the next five years; additionally, it should fill the Defense Authorization Act quota of an annual 5,000 Iraqis who have assisted US military efforts. The US should commit to resettle a total of 110,000 Iraqis in the next ten years, including the annual 5,000 included in the Defense Authorization Act quota. In the long term, most Iraqis should have returned to Iraq from Jordan to contribute to a strong society and continued security and stability in their country.

1 "Statistics on Displaced Iraqis Around the World," United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. September, 2007. <<http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf>>

2 CARE International. Personal Communications. June 2008.

- 3 Dr. Hasan Momeani, The University of Jordan, Amman, Jordan. Personal Communication. 10 June 2008.
- 4 Dennis Walto. Save the Children, Amman, Jordan. Personal Communication. 08 June 2008.
- 5 Ambassador David Hale. US Embassy in Amman, Jordan. Personal Communication 04 June 2008.
- 6 "Iraqis in Jordan: Their Numbers and Statistics", Fafo. May, 2007 <<http://www.faf.no/ais/middeast/jordan/IJ.pdf>>.
- 7 Ziad Ayad, Associate Research Officer in the Public Information Unit, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Amman, Jordan. Personal Communication. 18 June 2009.
- 8 H.E. Mr. Nasser Judeh, Minister of State for Media Affairs and Communication, Prime Ministry, Government of Jordan. Personal Communication, 12 June 2008.
- 9 Various Iraqi Refugees. Personal Communications. June 2008.
- 10 Ambassador David Hale. US Embassy in Amman, Jordan. Personal Communication 04 June 2008.

INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED

- Eva Abu Halaweh – Executive Director, Mizan, Law Group for Human Rights
- Bashir Abu Jamous – Governance Analyst, UNDP Jordan
- Mohammed Abu Rumman – Journalist & Head of Research, *Al-Ghad* Arabic Daily
- Raja Allawi – Iraq Delegation, ICRC Jordan
- Hassan Al-Momani – Director, International Studies Program, University of Jordan
- Jameel Al-Nimri – Political Analyst and Columnist, *Al-Arab Al Yawm* Daily Arabic Newspaper
- Oraib Al Rantawi – Director, Al Quds Center for Political Studies
- Kenana Amin – Office of Program Management, USAID
- Abdul Latif Arabiyat – Former Secretary General, Islamic Action Front (IAF)
- Ziad Ayad – Associate Research Officer, Public Information Unit, UNHCR
- Dana Bajjali – Mass Information Assistant, Public Information Unit, UNHCR
- Ben Ball – Deputy Political Officer, US Embassy, Jordan
- Hassan Barari – Researcher, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan
- David Bruns – Team Leader, Social Sectors Office, USAID
- Harriet Dodd – Director, CARE International Jordan
- Caroline Douilliez-Sabouba – Head of Project, Women and War, Iraq Delegation, ICRC Jordan
- Ahmed Drua – Jordan Public Security Directorate
- Hashim Elzein Elmoussaad – Head of Mission, WHO Jordan
- Jason Erb – Deputy Country Director, Emergency Programs, Jordan/Lebanon Country Office, Save the Children
- Bill Flink – Former Director, Jordan International Police Training Center
- Phil Frayne – Public Affairs Officer, US Embassy, Jordan
- Fedra Ghraibeh – Director, Coordination Office for Iraqi Reconstruction, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Government of Jordan
- Steve Gonyea – Director, Office of Economic Growth, USAID
- Kim Gordon-Bates – Deputy Head of Delegation, ICRC Jordan
- Ambassador David Hale – US Embassy, Jordan
- Tawfique Hasou – Director of Research, Jordan Institute of Diplomacy
- Hani Hourani – Director, Al Urdun Al Jadid Research Center
- H.E. Mr. Nasser Judeh – Minister of State for Media Affairs and Communication, Prime Ministry, Government of Jordan
- Asma Khader – Secretary General, Jordanian National Commission for Women
- Ayman Khalil – Director, Center for Research on Arms Control and Security, Arab Institute for Security Studies, University of Jordan
- Mohammed Khalil – Program Manager, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (German non-profit organization promoting democracy and civil society)
- Laetitia Kraus – Political Information Officer, UNOPS Jordan

- Nuha Ma'ayta – Former Member of Parliament and Current Head, General Federation of Jordanian Women (GFJW)
- Dana Mansuri – Deputy Director, USAID Mission to Jordan
- Yasar Qatarneh – Director, Regional Center on Conflict Prevention
- Rula Qawas – Director, Center for Women's Studies, University of Jordan
- Mouin Rabbani – Independent Analyst and Former Analyst, Middle East Program, International Crisis Group
- Vince Raimondi – Director, Iraq Support Unit, US Embassy, Jordan
- Matar Saqer – Public Information Officer, UNRWA
- SA Andrew Schad – Director of Force Protection Detachment, US Embassy, Jordan
- Katie Schaefer – Office of Public Affairs, US Embassy, Jordan
- H.E. Mr. Nasser Shraideh – Secretary General, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Government of Jordan
- Laura Slobey – Team Leader, Population and Family Health, USAID
- Peter Krogh Sorensen – Director, UNOPS Jordan
- Kathryn Stevens – Director, Office of Program Management, USAID
- Brett Walker – Intern, Center for Research on Arms Control and Security, Arab Institute for Security Studies, University of Jordan
- Dennis Walto – Country Director for Jordan and Lebanon, Save the Children
- Duffy Winters – Economics Officer, US Embassy, Jordan
- LTC David Womack – Department of Military Assistance Program Office, US Embassy, Jordan
- Faiz Zoubi – Former Vice President, Mu'tah (the Jordanian Military Academy)
- Sami Zubaidy – Journalist, Al Rai Daily Newspaper
- Mahjoob Zweiri – Researcher, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan

- Iraqi refugees in Jordan
 - Widow with four young children
 - Mother with three disabled daughters
 - Wife of disappeared Iraqi translator with three children
 - Wife with three children and a husband who has disappeared
 - Sabayan woman
 - Iraqi youth – Save the Children Youth Programming, Nuzha Office

PARTICIPANT BIOGRAPHIES

ALEX J. BURTNES - USNA 2010

Alex J. Burtness is a junior Systems Engineering major at the United States Naval Academy. He is a member of the Infantry Skills Team, ALLIES, and the Midshipman Action Group. He is also a Deputy Director of the Naval Academy Foreign Affairs Conference. His academic interests include such varied topics as quantitative economics, classical literature, and international relations. He is a native of Portland, Oregon.

Prior to traveling to Jordan, he spent a month as an intern at the Naval Research Laboratory, writing algorithms for swarm control of autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles in the urban environment. He is continuing research in this field for his Honors thesis in the fall. After his junior year, he intends to begin work towards a M.S. in Applied Mathematics.

TIM FITZSIMONS - TUFTS 2010

Tim Fitzsimons is a third year International Relations major from Connecticut. He is very interested in the Middle East and was eager to examine US foreign policy spillover effects in Jordan. He is also interested in the workings of global migration flows, particularly the flow of undocumented labor in and out of the developing world and the Middle East. He is a member of the IGL programs the New Initiative for Middle East Peace (NIMEP) and a co-chair of [EXPOSURE], the IGL's organization for photojournalism, documentary studies, and human rights.

Through Exposure, Tim participated in a photojournalism workshop in Kashmir, where he wrote and photographed a story about the decaying tourism industry there. He was a member of the March 2007 NIMEP research delegation to Lebanon, where he created a multimedia project about Hezbollah. He was also a student in last year's EPIIC colloquium. After concluding his research in Jordan, he interned at the *Daily Star* newspaper in Beirut and participated in an Exposure/Aftermath Project photojournalism workshop in Gulu, Uganda. He is interested in making pictures work.

MIA HENCINSKI - USNA 2010

Mia Hencinski is a junior at the United States Naval Academy, majoring in Political Science and pursuing a minor in Arabic. She is a member of the D1 Women's Lacrosse Team, Art Club, ALLIES and part of the annual United States Leadership Conference Staff. A native of Atlanta, GA, she also lived in Germany, London and Washington DC, before her family settled in Severna Park, MD. Her experiences abroad fueled her passion for traveling and also her interest in meeting new people.

Mia was very excited to have had the opportunity to travel to the Middle East for the first time and to be one of the first Midshipmen to travel on the JRP. Although not sure yet what she is going to do during her naval career, she is confident that this

experience has helped her to become a better officer. She believes that if the military is going to act in the international setting, every member should be aware of pertinent international issues and have an open-minded perspective on different cultures. Following the JRP, Mia spent the remainder of her summer exploring the different military communities to which she will service select upon graduation in 2010.

NANCY HENRY - TUFTS 2009

Nancy Henry is a senior studying Anthropology and Political Science at Tufts University. She is co-chair of the Alliance Linking Leaders in Education and the Services (ALLIES) and has participated in several other programs at the Institute for Global Leadership, including the 2006-2007 Education for Public Inquiry and International Citizenship colloquium and the New Initiative for Middle East Peace. Through the IGL, Nancy traveled to Lebanon in Spring of 2007, where she explored the relationship between nationalism and the Lebanese Armed Forces. Nancy spent nine weeks last summer studying Arabic in Sana'a, Yemen; she is currently in her seventh semester of Arabic at Tufts. In Jordan, Nancy is particularly interested in the security problems posed by the Iraq war and hopes to examine the preventive measures Jordan is taking to keep the violence from spilling over the border. Nancy is interested in women's military service in the Middle East, security studies, and Middle Eastern history, politics, and society.

CHAS MORRISON - TUFTS 2011

Chas Morrison is a sophomore at Tufts University who plans on majoring in International Relations with a concentration in International Security. Through his participation in ALLIES, Chas attended the Student Conference on United States Affairs at West Point. Chas is also a member of the Tufts Community Union Senate and currently serves as Bi-Partisan Outreach Coordinator of the Tufts Republicans.

PIYALI KUNDU - TUFTS 2010

Piyali Kundu is a junior studying International Relations and Community Health at Tufts. Her family, homes, and interests are global. She was born in Calcutta, India and has lived abroad on numerous occasions. During her sophomore year in high school, she lived in Bulgaria as an exchange student at the American College of Sofia. During this time, her interests in developing countries' societies and social structures were established. Upon completing high school in New York City, where her family now lives, she had the chance to backpack across Europe on a self-styled journey spanning from London to the Black Sea. Travel and seeing the world as "a classroom" has been a continuously ingrained value in her life, and having family and friends throughout the world has been a great resource to learn and grow. Upon entering Tufts, she had opportunities through the various programs and institutions to complete a language immersion program in Sana'a Yemen, where she was also a volunteer at a health NGO. Her most recent endeavor was a research trip back to Calcutta focusing on health care safety net structures for women in the infamous slums. She was able to pursue this via the Institute for Global Leadership.

Within her academic interest in development, her inclination is toward health issues and the tremendous impact access to health care can have on communities in developing countries and communities. In addition to her research through the IGL, her work as a Citizenship and Public Service scholar with the Tisch College has placed her with an Asian and Pacific Islander health disparities NGO in downtown Boston where she works as a program coordinator for a women and girls awareness event. She plans to pursue future research and travel in the Middle East and India to see the connections between transitional and developing societies, women's health, and human development and security.

MARGARET O'CONNOR - TUFTS 2010

Margaret O'Connor is a junior political science and community health major. Her driving interest is in comparative health systems, particularly the ways in which culture, politics, philosophy and history shape the ways in which nations administer to sick populations. Her regional interests lie in the Middle East and its neighboring regions (North and East Africa, Eastern Europe and Western Asia). Margaret is a member of Synaptic Scholars, a program through the Tufts Institute for Global Leadership that is geared toward stimulating intellectual discussion on campus and supporting individual intellectual pursuits. She also sits on the editorial board for *TuftsScope*, Tufts' interdisciplinary student journal of health, ethics and policy.

She has a growing interest in civil-military relations that stems from the changing nature of war and peacekeeping, concern over a dissociation she believes many Americans harbor towards the services, and entry of friends and family into the military. She is particularly interested in the impact of the Iraq war on Jordan's domestic politics, its relations with Middle Eastern neighbors, and youth.

IVETTE TARRIDA - FLETCHER 2009

Ivette Tarrida is from Barcelona, Spain and came to the United States in 2001 to attend Bryn Mawr College, where she pursued a B.A. in Political Science and French Studies, and a concentration in International Economic Relations. Upon graduation in 2005, Ivette worked for two years at the Philadelphia law firm of Kohn, Swift & Graf, PC, primarily on high profile international human rights and terrorism financing cases, such as *Linde v. Arab Bank PLC*, brought under the Anti-Terrorism Act, and *In Re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation*, by which a class of around 7,000 human rights victims of the Marcos Regime was awarded a judgment of \$2 billion.

Ivette is currently a second-year graduate student at The Fletcher School, working towards the degree of Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy. Her concentrations are International Security Studies and Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization. Within the JRP, she was especially interested in looking at Jordanian national security policy. Ivette speaks Catalan, Spanish, French, and some Arabic.

ALEXANDRA TAYLOR - TUFTS 2009

Alexandra Taylor is a senior studying international relations at Tufts University and is from northern California. Alex first became involved with ALLIES as a sophomore, prior to participating in the 2007 Joint Research Project on Jordanian counterterrorism strategy. At Tufts, Alex has been involved with many programs of the Institute for Global Leadership including the 2006-2007 EPIIC Colloquium on Global Governance: Crises and Intervention. She is also a member of the IGL's Synaptic Scholars program. Additionally, Alex has interned on a number of projects studying terrorism and the process of radicalization at The Fletcher School's Jebesen Center for Counterterrorism Studies and at the Harvard Health and Psychophysiology Lab. Alex studied abroad in Madrid, Spain for the spring 2008 semester.

ZACHARY MICHAEL TEDOFF - USMA 2009

Zachary Michael Tedoff was born and raised in Colts Neck, New Jersey. He attended the Marine Academy of Science and Technology on Sandy Hook, NJ for high school, where he participated in Naval Junior ROTC and Track. Upon graduation, Zack entered Cadet Basic Training at the United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, as a member of the class of 2009. He is currently a senior at the Academy and is majoring in International Relations. Zack is finishing his second year of Arabic study. He is very interested in the Middle East, and has traveled to Israel and Egypt in recent years, touring each country, practicing Arabic, and thinking about the problems that each country faces.

SALLY WHITE - USMA 2009

Originally from Cary, North Carolina, Sally is currently a cadet at the United States Military Academy. She is pursuing a major in International Relations and a minor in Middle Eastern Area Studies, two fields which she hopes will prove useful for the duration of her military career and any career she chooses to pursue thereafter. She also competes in NCAA Division I swimming as a member of the USMA swim team.

Her interest in the ALLIES Joint Research Project stems from a desire to broaden her knowledge of civil-military relations and their effect on American foreign policy, specifically in regards to the Middle East. The execution of the Iraq war in particular has shown how mistrust and lack of communication between civilian and military institutions can impact US foreign policy. In addition, the global repercussions of the war have shown how US foreign policy can affect far more nations than it originally targets. Thus, in order to improve both the effective use of military force as an instrument of political policy and to develop an increased awareness of the scope of US policy decisions in a globalized world, she is interested in improving the relationship between the American military and its corresponding civilian institutions. This research project provided a valuable opportunity to explore the relationship between a country's internal politics and its external policies.

PARTICIPATING INSTITUTIONS



Institute for Global Leadership, Tufts University

Mission Statement

To prepare new generations of critical thinkers for effective and ethical leadership, ready to act as global citizens in addressing international and national issues across cultures.



United States Military Academy

Mission Statement

To educate, train, and inspire the Corps of Cadets so that each graduate is a commissioned leader of character committed to the values of Duty, Honor, Country and prepared for a career of professional excellence and service to the Nation as an officer in the United States Army.



United States Naval Academy

Mission Statement

To develop midshipmen morally, mentally and physically and to imbue them with the highest ideals of duty, honor and loyalty in order to provide graduates who are dedicated to a career of naval service and have potential for future development in mind and character to assume the highest responsibilities of command, citizenship and government.

ALLIES

THE ALLIANCE LINKING LEADERS
IN EDUCATION AND THE SERVICES

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